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1. Introduction 
In a recent paper, Bajo-Rubio (2014) has shown that Thirlwall’s law (Thirlwall, 1979) can be 
extended to derive the economic growth rate that is consistent with equilibrium between any two 
variables, e.g. between government revenue and government expenditure. Thirlwall’s law has 
long been used to estimate an economy’s balance of payments-constrained growth rate (see 
Thirlwall (2011) for a discussion and a review of some studies using the law). However, there do 
not seem to have been any studies done to calculate government budget balance-consistent 
growth rates. 
The aim of the present paper is to address this gap in the literature by investigating whether 
the euro area countries are growing at rates that are consistent with a balanced government 
budget and to discuss the resulting policy implications from the analysis. Using the model derived 
by Bajo-Rubio (2014), this paper estimates government budget balance-consistent growth rates 
for the euro area countries and then compares these estimates to the actual growth rates of these 
economies. This comparison enables conclusions to be drawn as to whether government deficits 
may pose a threat to the future growth prospects of these countries. As the next section argues, 
this threat arises in various ways but also from the fact that a country may need to take corrective 
measures to tackle any persistent and excessive budget deficits, as the resulting increases in 
government debt cannot continue indefinitely without leading to a future fiscal crisis. These 
corrective (contractionary) measures may, therefore, have a negative impact on future economic 
growth.  The approach taken by this paper is that if countries are growing at rates that are similar 
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to their government budget balance-consistent growth rates, such negative effects on growth 
would be avoided. Another aim of this paper is to investigate the predictions of the model and 
how they relate to the actual experience of these countries. 
In summary, the main results and implications of the analysis are: (a) The majority of euro 
area countries are growing at rates which are very similar to their government balance-consistent 
growth rates. This suggests that many of these countries would not be experiencing excessive 
imbalances in their government budget over the long-run and, therefore, there would be no need 
to take significant corrective measures that could harm future economic growth; (b) For many 
countries in the sample, the predictions of the model seem to be broadly consistent with their 
actual fiscal experience; and, (c) For those countries whose budget deficit may pose a serious 
threat to future economic growth, this paper discusses ways to reduce their government balance-
consistent growth rate. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section focuses on the effects 
of budget deficits, while section 3 explains the theoretical model and research approach. Section 
4 presents and discusses the data, results and their implications while section 5 checks the 
robustness of the results. The last section offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. The effects of budget deficits 
The empirical literature on the effects of budget deficits on economic growth is extensive. It is not 
the aim of this paper to provide an extensive review of this literature as the present paper is 
employing a different theoretical approach (which is discussed in the next section). As far as it 
can be ascertained, there are no other empirical studies that have employed the same approach 
as the present paper. Thus, the discussion in this section is intended to highlight the importance 
of studying this topic by noting the likely effects of budget deficits on economic growth with some 
results from the literature. 
Budget deficits may affect economic growth in various ways. There is, for example, a huge 
literature analysing the effects of budget deficits on interest rates, see amongst others, the studies 
of Laubach (2009), Kameda (2014), and Cebula (2018). The theoretical argument here is that 
higher budget deficits may increase interest rates as the government tries to finance the deficit 
with increased borrowing. In addition, higher budget deficits may increase consumption and 
reduce national saving, thus, leading to a rise in interest rates. The resulting higher interest rates 
may crowd-out private investment, reduce the capital stock and, hence, reduce long-term 
economic growth. Thus, any short-run positive effects on consumption and growth via Keynesian 
multiplier effects may be eliminated in the long-run. 
Furthermore, economic theory suggests that budget deficits may be inflationary if, for example, 
they are financed by an increase in the money supply. For example, studies by Jalil et al (2014) 
and Ahmad and Aworinde (2019) found that budget deficits are indeed inflationary. On the other 
hand, Catão and Terrones (2005) have investigated this issue for various groups of countries and 
have reported that budget deficits increase inflation in developing countries and in countries with 
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already high inflation but do not in the case of advanced countries with already low inflation. 
Similarly, Lin and Chu (2013), using panel data for 91 countries over 47 years, looked at episodes 
of low, middle and high inflation and have found that budget deficits increase the inflation rate in 
the latter two episodes; however, in the case of low-inflation episodes, they have reported a weak 
impact of budget deficits on inflation. 
Another possible negative effect of higher budget deficits is that they can lead to higher current 
account deficits (the twin deficits hypothesis), see for example, the evidence presented by Forte 
and Magazzino (2013) and Trachanas and Katrakilidis (2013). This negative effect on the current 
account deficit may come about via the various consequences of budget deficits discussed above. 
For example, if budget deficits increase interest rates, the resulting increase in financial inflows 
will cause an exchange rate appreciation with negative effects on the current account deficit. 
Furthermore, if budget deficits lead to inflation, the resulting loss in competitiveness will also 
increase the current account deficit. In addition, if budget deficits lead to an increase in private 
consumption, the current account deficit will increase as expenditure on imported goods is likely 
to increase. 
The literature investigating the effects of budget deficits on economic growth is voluminous 
and shows mixed results. Cebula (1995), for example, has investigated the effect of US budget 
deficits on US economic growth and has found a negative effect. In contrast, the results of Taylor 
et al. (2012), using US data from 1961-2011, suggest that higher budget deficits increase 
economic growth. Adam and Bevan (2005) found that reducing the budget deficit to around 1.5% 
of GDP enhances growth (but any further reduction does not). Castro (2011) has investigated the 
effect of the fiscal rules of the European Union on growth and did not find a negative effect. Finally, 
Lau and Yip (2019) have analysed the effect of budget deficits on the economic growth of ASEAN 
countries both before and after the Global Financial Crisis and have reported that budget deficits 
had a negative effect before the crisis but a positive effect after it. 
 
3. Theoretical model and research approach 
In a recent paper, Bajo-Rubio (2014) has shown that Thirlwall’s law (Thirlwall, 1979) can be 
generalised to calculate the growth rate that is consistent with an equilibrium between any two 
variables. Focusing on the government budget balance, where the relevant economic variables 
are government revenue (T) and government expenditure (G), Bajo-Rubio (2014) has shown that 
the rate of economic growth that is consistent with a balanced budget is given by equation (1) 
below: 
 ŷgb = ġ / ety    (1) 
 
In equation (1), ŷgb is the government balance-consistent growth rate (i.e. the rate of growth of an 
economy that is consistent with a balanced government budget), ġ is the rate of growth of 
government expenditure, and ety  is the income elasticity of tax revenues (a measure of the 
responsiveness of tax revenues to a change in national income). 
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In deriving equation (1), Bajo-Rubio (2014) assumes that initially G=T and, therefore, equation 
(1) shows that the budget balance will be maintained if the growth rate of government expenditure 
is equal to the growth rate of government revenue, with the latter growth rate estimated in the 
model as (ŷgb times ety). Equation (1), therefore, shows the rate of economic growth consistent 
with the equality of government revenue and government expenditure. This government balance-
consistent growth rate effectively defines the lowest rate at which an economy can grow without 
experiencing budget deficits.1 As Bajo-Rubio (2014) stated, if an economy grows at a rate greater 
than ŷgb it will experience a budget surplus and if it grows at a rate lower than ŷgb it will experience 
a budget deficit. In the latter case, the resulting budget deficits may affect the growth prospects 
of an economy in various ways, as discussed in the previous section. For example, a country may 
need to take corrective measures to tackle the persistent budget deficits as the resulting increases 
in government debt are a burden on future generations that cannot continue indefinitely without 
leading to a future fiscal crisis. These measures may come through a reduction in government 
expenditure or an increase in taxation, which may have a negative effect on future economic 
growth. Thus, the eventual tackling of persistent budget deficits and the resulting government 
debt may negatively affect future economic growth. 
Using equation (1), this paper estimates the government budget balance-consistent growth 
rates for all nineteen euro area countries and then compares these estimates to the actual growth 
rates of these economies. This comparison enables conclusions to be drawn as to whether fiscal 
imbalances are likely to be a serious problem. This paper also investigates the predictions of the 
model and how they relate to the actual experience of these countries.2 The next section presents 
and discusses the data, results and implications of the analysis. 
 
4. Data, results and implications 
4.1. Data 
To apply the above framework, the analysis requires estimates of the growth rate of government 
expenditure (ġ) and of the income elasticity of tax revenue (ety) for all 19 member states of the 
euro area. The analysis also requires estimates of the actual growth rate of real GDP (?̇?𝑦) for each 
country. As proxies for ġ and  ?̇?𝑦, the paper uses the estimated coefficient of the time trend in a 
regression of the natural logarithm of each variable in level form on a constant and a time trend. 
The data used in both cases is over the period 1995-2018 and were taken from the annual 
macroeconomic database of the European Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs (AMECO). The data for government expenditure refers to the real total 
expenditure of general government (code: OUTG), while data for the income variable refer to real 
                                                     
1 Bajo-Rubio (2014) refers to this as the government balance-constrained growth rate. This paper prefers the term 
government balance-consistent growth rate since an economy can grow at above this rate and experience a budget 
surplus, which is not necessarily a constraint. 
2 As mentioned in the previous section, there do not seem to be any other empirical studies that have employed the same 
approach as the present paper. There is, however, a huge literature investigating the sustainability of fiscal policy by 
focusing on the intertemporal budget constraint, see for example, the recent papers by Brady and Magazzino (2018a, 
2018b) and the numerous studies cited therein. 
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Gross Domestic Product at 2010 reference levels (code OVGD). Data for the real total 
expenditure of general government were only available for all countries from 1995, and this 
dictated the sample size. Estimates for the income elasticity of tax revenue (ety) were taken from 
Koester and Priesmeier (2017), but the robustness of the results was checked by using other tax 
elasticity estimates as explained later in this paper. 
 
4.2. Results 
The results of the estimated government balance-consistent economic growth rates are 
summarised in Table 1. 
The following points provide a discussion of the results presented in Table 1. 
(a) The first observation that can be drawn from these results is that most euro area countries 
are growing at rates (?̇?𝑦) which are very similar to their government balance-consistent growth 
rates (ŷgb). This suggests that many of these countries should not be experiencing excessive 
imbalances in their government budget over the long-run. Thus, for many of these countries, the 
budget deficit may not pose a serious threat to future economic growth as corrective 
(contractionary) measures to tackle it would not be necessary. As can be seen in Table 1, six 
countries are growing at rates above their government balance-consistent growth rates and are, 
therefore, expected to experience budget surpluses. The remaining countries are growing at rates 
that are below their government balance-consistent growth rates and are, therefore, expected to 
experience budget deficits. However, for many of the latter countries, the actual growth rate is 
very close to the government balance-consistent growth rate and, as such, the resulting budget 
deficits may not be a serious problem. (Section 4.3 discusses further implications of the analysis, 
especially for those countries which are growing at rates that are below their government balance-
consistent growth rate). 
(b) The last two columns of Table 1 summarise the actual experience of these countries: they 
show, respectively, the average budget deficit and average budget surplus (as a percentage of 
GDP) over the period 1995-2018, i.e. the average deficit of those years where a country had a 
deficit and the average surplus of those years where a country had a surplus. This was calculated 
using data on Net lending/net borrowing of the general government as a percentage of GDP 
(variable code UBLG in the AMECO database). As can be seen, most of these countries had 
small budget imbalances over the period which tends to support the predictions of the model (as 
many of them were growing at rates which are very similar to their government balance-consistent 
growth rates).3 It is important to mention here that this may be the result of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) which constrains, in general, euro area countries to budget deficits of no 
greater than 3% of their GDP. This SGP requirement imposes discipline on the growth of 
government expenditure in these countries which, via equation (1), lowers their government 
balance-consistent growth rate. 
                                                     
3 It goes without saying that if this paper had averaged deficits and surpluses together over the period, the resulting budget 
imbalances will be lower for most countries than those shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Estimates of the government balance-consistent economic growth rates. 







Austria 0.99 1.42 1.43 1.70 -2.61 0.11 
Belgium 1.06 2.00 1.89 1.67 -2.41 0.13 
Cyprus 1.40 3.56 2.54 2.35 -3.95 1.54 
Estonia 0.96 3.86 4.02 3.67 -1.00 1.30 
Finland 1.07 2.01 1.88 1.81 -2.35 3.61 
France 1.05 1.83 1.74 1.47 -3.60 nap 
Germany 1.04 0.76 0.73 1.33 -2.88 0.87 
Greece 1.21 1.15 0.95 0.41 -7.86 0.76 
Ireland 0.88 4.14 4.70 4.52 -6.88 1.72 
Italy 1.15 0.46 0.40 0.36 -3.37 nap 
Latvia 0.98 4.17 4.26 3.77 -2.37 0.50 
Lithuania 1.07 3.48 3.25 3.99 -3.32 0.46 
Luxembourg 1.00 3.46 3.46 3.15 -0.87 2.28 
Malta 1.17 2.90 2.48 3.25 -4.42 2.11 
Netherlands 0.96 1.51 1.57 1.67 -2.78 0.63 
Portugal 1.20 1.39 1.16 0.81 -4.84 nap 
Slovakia 0.80 3.07 3.84 3.89 -4.57 nap 
Slovenia 0.98 2.46 2.51 2.34 -3.75 0.37 
Spain 1.06 2.26 2.13 1.88 -4.58 1.78 
Notes and sources (Table 1): ety are the long-run income elasticities of tax revenue taken from Koester and Priesmeier 
(2017) except for Lithuania which was not part of their study. The estimate for Lithuania is taken from European 
Commission (2014, pg. 45); ġ is the (percentage) growth rate of real government expenditure; ŷgb is the government 
balance-consistent economic growth rate calculated using equation 1; and ẏ is the actual (percentage) growth rate of real 
GDP. The last two columns show the average budget deficit and average budget surplus (as a percentage of GDP) over 
the period 1995-2018 (i.e. the average deficit of those years where a country had a deficit and the average surplus of 
those years where a country had a surplus, respectively); nap stands for not applicable. 
 
 
(c) The paper takes now a closer look at each country individually. As explained earlier in the 
paper, if an economy grows at a rate greater than ŷgb, the model predicts that it will have a budget 
surplus and if it grows at a rate lower than ŷgb it will have a budget deficit. Therefore, as already 
mentioned, the model predicts a deficit for 13 euro area countries and a surplus for the remaining 
six. In several cases, these predictions seem to be consistent with the experience of these 
countries, but in some cases, they are not. Let’s consider each country in turn by comparing the 
prediction of the model with the actual fiscal experience of each country over the 1995-2018 
period: 
• Austria: The model predicts a budget surplus. However, for most of the 1995-2018 period, 
the country has experienced a deficit, albeit a small one on average. 
• Belgium: The model predicts a budget deficit. This is consistent with the experience of the 
country over most of the 1995-2018 period. 
• Cyprus: The model predicts a budget deficit. This is consistent with the experience of the 
country over most of the 1995-2018 period. 
• Estonia: The model predicts a budget deficit. However, for about half of the years over the 
1995-2018 period, the country has experienced a small surplus and for the remaining years 
a small deficit (i.e. overall, the country had a fairly balanced budget). 
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• Finland: The model predicts a budget deficit. This is consistent with the post-2009 
experience of the country but not with the pre-2009 experience. 
• France: The model predicts a budget deficit. This is consistent with the experience of the 
country over the period as France has experienced deficits in all years of the 1995-2018 
period. 
• Germany: The model predicts a budget surplus. Even though Germany had a surplus in 
the post-2014 period, for almost all previous years it has experienced deficits. 
• Greece: The model predicts a budget deficit. This is consistent with the experience of the 
country over most of the period. 
• Ireland: The model predicts a budget deficit. However, for about half of the years over the 
1995-2018 period, the country has experienced a surplus and for the remaining years a 
deficit. 
• Italy: The model predicts a budget deficit. Italy has experienced deficits in all years of the 
1995-2018 period. 
• Latvia: The model predicts a budget deficit. This is consistent with the experience of the 
country over most of the period. 
• Lithuania: The model predicts a budget surplus. This is not consistent with the experience 
of the country over most of the period. 
• Luxembourg: The model predicts a budget deficit. This is not consistent with the experience 
of the country over most of the period. 
• Malta: The model predicts a budget surplus. This is not consistent with the experience of 
the country over most of the period. 
• Netherlands: The model predicts a budget surplus. The country had experienced surpluses 
in seven years over the period and deficits in the rest. These imbalances have been 
generally small. 
• Portugal: The model predicts a budget deficit. Portugal has experienced deficits in all years 
of the 1995-2018 period. 
• Slovakia: The model predicts a budget surplus. The model prediction is inconsistent with 
actual experience as Slovakia has experienced deficits in all years of the 1995-2018 period. 
• Slovenia: The model predicts a budget deficit. This is consistent with the experience of the 
country over most of the period. 
• Spain: The model predicts a budget deficit. This is consistent with the experience of the 
country over most of the period. 
 
It is important to stress that the above (individual country) predictions should be interpreted 
with care as most of the euro area countries were growing at rates (?̇?𝑦) which were very similar to 
their government balance-consistent growth rates (ŷgb). Thus, even though some of the individual 
predictions are not consistent with actual experience, the imbalances for most countries are 
predicted to be small (which was the case for many of these countries). This is also supported by 
the fact that most of these countries have experienced deficits in some years and surpluses in 
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others over the 1995-2018 period. 
 
4.3. Implications 
This section focuses on the implications of the analysis, especially for those countries whose 
actual growth rate is below their government balance-consistent growth rate and, as such, the 
resulting budget deficits may be a serious problem. Apart from the obvious implication that such 
countries should try to increase their actual rates of economic growth (in ways that do not increase 
their budget deficit), they may also try to take measures to reduce their government balance-
consistent growth rate. It should be clear from equation (1) that this can be done in two ways: 
firstly, by reducing the growth rate of government expenditure (ġ); and, secondly, by adopting 
measures that increase the income elasticity of tax revenue (ety). 
If reducing the growth rate of government expenditure may have a negative impact on 
economic growth, what conclusion can be drawn about the appropriate rate of growth of 
government expenditure? To answer this question, we need to look at the evidence on tax 
revenue elasticities.  The empirical literature seems to suggest that total tax revenue elasticities 
are not different from one for many countries.4 For example, Deli et al (2018), using panel data of 
25 OECD countries from 1965-2015, have shown that the long-run estimates of total revenue 
elasticities for the panel are not different from one. They have also shown that this result holds 
for most countries in their sample (for 16 out of 25 countries). Similar results have also been 
obtained by Dudine and Jalles (2018). Belinga et al (2014) have also found that, for about half of 
the countries in their sample, the long-run total tax buoyancies were not statistically different from 
one.5 Using equation (1), these results from the literature suggest that, for many countries, a 
balanced government budget requires that the growth rate of government expenditure (ġ) must 
be equal to the rate of economic growth (?̇?𝑦); or, to avoid deficits, the growth rate of government 
expenditure must not exceed the rate of economic growth. Put differently, any percentage change 
in government expenditure must lead to an at least equal percentage change in aggregate 
income.6 A similar point has been made by Dudine and Jalles (2018). Another possible course of 
action is for countries to change the composition (but not the level) of their government 
expenditure in ways that enhance economic growth. For example, Bussière et al (2017) have 
shown that an increase in government investment of 1% of GDP that is compensated by a similar 
fall in government consumption will stimulate economic growth. 
                                                     
4 Even though Koester and Priesmeier (2017) have found that, for most of the countries in their sample, the long-run tax 
revenue elasticities are statistically different from one, the estimated value for many of them is close to one. This is also 
supported by the data given in Table C1 of their paper that summarises tax revenue elasticities estimated in other studies. 
As Koester and Priesmeier (2017) note, the difference in these elasticity estimates is small despite the fact that some of 
the estimates are based on GDP growth and others on the output gap. 
5 See Deli et al (2018), Dudine and Jalles (2018) and Koester and Priesmeier (2017) for a discussion of the differences 
between tax buoyancies and tax elasticities. 
6 This does not mean that the fiscal multiplier effect is not present. This is because, in absolute monetary (euro) terms, a 
given percentage change in GDP is a bigger value than the same percentage change in government spending. For 
example, a 1% increase in government spending may lead to a 1% increase in GDP but the latter change is bigger in 
absolute monetary terms (due to the multiplier effect). However, as Ramey (2019) shows, recent evidence suggests that 
government expenditure multipliers range from 0.6-1, i.e. they may be less than 1. 
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The second course of action for a country is to adopt measures that increase the income 
elasticity of tax revenue. There are many factors that could influence this. As Koester and 
Priesmeier (2017) argue, the composition of tax revenue (as between various direct and indirect 
taxes) is relevant here. For example, empirical evidence tends to suggest that corporate taxes 
are more responsive to GDP growth and have a long-run tax buoyancy greater than one in 
advanced economies, see for example the evidence presented by Belinga et al (2014), Dudine 
and Jalles (2018) and Deli et al (2018).7 Thus, if total tax revenue relies more heavily on more 
buoyant taxes, then the income elasticity of total tax revenue will be higher (Dudine and Jalles, 
2018). Furthermore, as Dudine and Jalles (2018) and Koester and Priesmeier (2017) argue, 
taking measures to improve tax collection in ways that enhance tax compliance would also 
increase the income elasticity of total tax revenue. In addition, Dudine and Jalles (2018) have 
shown that more openness to trade, higher human capital, and lower volatility in output and 
inflation would also increase tax buoyancies. Koester and Priesmeier (2017) have also argued 
that a more progressive tax structure could increase tax revenue elasticities. The above factors, 
therefore, could be considered by a country trying to increase its income elasticity of total tax 
revenue. For a more detailed discussion of these factors see Dudine and Jalles (2018), Koester 
and Priesmeier (2017) and Belinga et al (2014). 
 
5. Checking the robustness of the results 
To check the robustness of the conclusions, this paper has also calculated government balance-
consistent growth rates using elasticity estimates from two other sources: (a) the long-run total 
tax buoyancies estimated by Dudine and Jalles (2018) (for those countries whose estimates were 
statistically significant); and, (b) the long-run total tax buoyancies estimated by Belinga et al 
(2014). The results of these robustness checks are presented in Table 2. (Please note that not 
all euro area countries were covered by the above two studies). 
Comparing the actual growth rates of these countries with the government balance-consistent 
growth rates calculated using the new elasticity estimates (given in Table 2) reveals that the 
conclusions remain the same for most countries.  Thus, the results and conclusions based on 
Table 1 are robust with the following four exceptions: 
 
• Ireland: The conclusions for Ireland remain the same when using the Dudine and Jalles 
(2018) elasticity estimate but not when using the Belinga et al. (2014) estimate. In the latter 
case, the model predicts a budget surplus. As has been noted earlier, for about half of the 
years over the 1995-2018 period, the country had experienced a surplus and for the 
remaining years a deficit. 
 
                                                     
7 The latter two studies have also shown that corporate income tax buoyancies are greater during downturns than during 
expansions of economic activity. For another analysis of the effects of the business cycle on tax elasticities, see Boschi 
and d’Addona (2017). 
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Table 2. Robustness checks. 
 ety (B) ety (DJ) ŷgb (B) ŷgb (DJ) ?̇?𝑦 
Austria 1.07 1.0 1.33 1.42 1.70 
Belgium 1.03 1.013 1.94 1.97 1.67 
Cyprus na 1.446 na 2.46 2.35 
Estonia 0.98 1.019 3.94 3.79 3.67 
Finland 1.08 1.007 1.86 2.00 1.81 
France 1.12 1.054 1.63 1.74 1.47 
Germany 1.05 1.422 0.72 0.53 1.33 
Greece 1.09 1.953 1.06 0.59 0.41 
Ireland 0.98 0.911 4.22 4.54 4.52 
Italy 1.13 0.807 0.41 0.57 0.36 
Latvia na na na na 3.77 
Lithuania na na na na 3.99 
Luxembourg 1.05 ns 3.30 na 3.15 
Malta na na na na 3.25 
Netherlands 0.86 ns 1.76 na 1.67 
Portugal 1.12 1.295 1.24 1.07 0.81 
Slovakia 0.75 0.798 4.09 3.85 3.89 
Slovenia 1.01 1.017 2.44 2.42 2.34 
Spain 1.21 ns 1.87 na 1.88 
Notes and sources (Table 2): ety (B) are the long-run total tax buoyancies taken from Table 1 of  Belinga et al (2014); ety 
(DJ) are the long-run total tax buoyancies taken from Table A1a of Dudine and Jalles (2018); ŷgb (B) and ŷgb (DJ) are the 
respective government balance-consistent growth rates calculated using equation (1); ẏ is the actual (percentage) growth 
rate of real GDP; na implies that data were not available and ns implies that the estimates were not statistically significant 
and, therefore, not utilised. 
 
 
• Netherlands: Using the Belinga et al. (2014) elasticity estimate, the model now predicts a 
budget deficit. As has been noted earlier, the country had experienced surpluses in seven 
years over the period and deficits in the rest (but these imbalances have generally been 
small). 
• Slovakia: The conclusions for Slovakia remain the same when using the Dudine and Jalles 
(2018) elasticity estimate but not when using the Belinga et al. (2014) estimate. In the latter 
case, the model now predicts a budget deficit which is consistent with actual experience, 
as Slovakia had experienced deficits in all the years of the 1995-2018 period.  
• Spain: Using the Belinga et al. (2014) elasticity estimate, the model now predicts a 
balanced budget as the actual growth rate is almost the same as the government balance-
consistent growth rate. As has been noted earlier, though, Spain has experienced budget 
deficits over most of the 1995-2018 period. 
  
6. Conclusions 
An important issue in macroeconomics is the link between economic growth and the government 
fiscal balance.  Using the model derived by Bajo-Rubio (2014), this paper has estimated 
government budget balance-consistent growth rates for the euro area countries and compared 
these estimates to the actual growth rates of these economies. This comparison enabled an 
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assessment as to whether any fiscal imbalances may pose a threat to future economic growth. 
This threat could arise, for example, from the fact that a country may need to take corrective 
measures to tackle any persistent budget deficits, as the resulting increases in government debt 
cannot continue indefinitely without leading to a future financial crisis. These corrective 
(contractionary) fiscal measures may, therefore, have a negative impact on future economic 
growth. Such corrective measures may also be necessary if budget deficits lead to higher inflation 
and higher current account deficits. Furthermore, budget deficits may lower economic growth if 
they lead to higher interest rates that may crowd-out private investment. 
The analysis has revealed that most euro area countries are growing at rates that are very 
similar to their government balance-consistent growth rates. This finding suggests that many of 
these countries would not be experiencing excessive fiscal imbalances. Therefore, there would 
be no need for major contractionary measures that could harm future economic growth. This 
finding may be the result of the fiscal discipline imposed on these countries by the Stability and 
Growth Pact. The analysis has also shown that, for many countries in the sample, the predictions 
of the model seem to be broadly consistent with their actual fiscal experience. In terms of policy 
implications, this paper has summarised ways to reduce the government balance-consistent 
growth rate by increasing the income elasticity of tax revenue and/or by reducing the growth rate 





I am grateful to two anonymous referees of this journal for useful comments, but I am solely 
responsible for any remaining errors. 
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